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+---- Thread: Tor Vulnerability (/Thread-Tor-Vulnerability)
Tor Vulnerability - lady_godiva - 08-09-2013
First of all this is not a tutorial. As it was requested i post this link which explains a congestion attack to identify the first node (user who wants to stay anonymous) in a tor circuit. I Apologize i cannot write about it in details but i am very busy, so i provide the link below :
Code:
http://freehaven.net/anonbib/papers/congestion-longpaths.pdf- Please notice that this is a research paper so it's not an easy reading however it fully explains the problem.
- For those who wander what's the solution : Tor project has implemented bridges which hides most relays making this congestion attack not feasible. Another possible solution is to customize the path length (if i'm not mistaken 8 hops is the maximum). Tor default is 3 so when you estabilish a circuit by default it will be 3 hops long.
- Making longer paths, 4 + hops, will make congestion attack infeasible as tor switches circuits every 10 minutes and experimental results showed that it is not feasible to identify the hops in 10 mins.
- Notice however that increasing the circuit length will very probably cause a slow down in network speed for obvious reasons.
Tor Vulnerability - lady_godiva - 08-09-2013
First of all this is not a tutorial. As it was requested i post this link which explains a congestion attack to identify the first node (user who wants to stay anonymous) in a tor circuit. I Apologize i cannot write about it in details but i am very busy, so i provide the link below :
Code:
http://freehaven.net/anonbib/papers/congestion-longpaths.pdf- Please notice that this is a research paper so it's not an easy reading however it fully explains the problem.
- For those who wander what's the solution : Tor project has implemented bridges which hides most relays making this congestion attack not feasible. Another possible solution is to customize the path length (if i'm not mistaken 8 hops is the maximum). Tor default is 3 so when you estabilish a circuit by default it will be 3 hops long.
- Making longer paths, 4 + hops, will make congestion attack infeasible as tor switches circuits every 10 minutes and experimental results showed that it is not feasible to identify the hops in 10 mins.
- Notice however that increasing the circuit length will very probably cause a slow down in network speed for obvious reasons.
RE: Tor Vulnerability - chmod - 08-09-2013
Was waiting for this I don't have time to read the information in the link right now but will be bookmarking it for later
RE: Tor Vulnerability - chmod - 08-09-2013
Was waiting for this I don't have time to read the information in the link right now but will be bookmarking it for later
RE: Tor Vulnerability - lady_godiva - 08-09-2013
It is a good idea to take enough time to read it, despite that, even if i could not write it myself explaining it in an easier way, just write here if there's something not clear
RE: Tor Vulnerability - lady_godiva - 08-09-2013
It is a good idea to take enough time to read it, despite that, even if i could not write it myself explaining it in an easier way, just write here if there's something not clear
RE: Tor Vulnerability - Anunnaki - 09-04-2013
How do you make Tor go through 4 networks instead of the normal 3?
RE: Tor Vulnerability - lady_godiva - 09-12-2013
My knowledge about it might be a little outdated but i think this can be done in 2 ways :
1) edit the torrc file, which is tor configuration file, to suit your needs
2) Give a look at
Code:
https://thesprawl.org/projects/tor-autocircuit/